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EXTENDING DECOLONIZATION: How THE UNITED NATIONS
MIGHT HAVE ADDRESSED Kosovo
Thomas D. Grant*
I. INTRODUCTION
Use of force against Yugoslavia, initiated on March 24, 1999, raised vexing
problems about international governance. This article identifies two problems
in particular and suggests an alternative approach which may have averted
them.
The Kosovo crisis can be characterized as a crisis of self-determination.
When a group of human beings achieves self-determination, it is manifested
by the participation of the group in the governance of a state. Where there are
no other groups in the territory of the state, this will mean a monopoly by the
group over governance. Where more than one group lives within a state,
(which is to say, in most states) self-determination means shared participation
in governance either through democratic institutions constituting a unitary
government or through sub-state territorial units possessing their own
competencies such as "autonomy" or "self-government." An important
incident of self-determination when expressed this way is the right of the state
to maintain its territorial integrity. Not all groups however have achieved self-
determination. Where a group has not achieved self-determination, it may
later be achieved through a change in the organization of the state in which the
group lives. That change aims to give the group participatory rights in
governance in either of the two ways just noted. Or, self-determination may
be achieved through creation of a new state. Neither reorganizing a state nor
creating a new state, however, is a simple matter. When a group of people
breaks from the state of which they were a part, that state may be said to suffer
a derogation of its territorial integrity-derogation of the self-determination
its people had earlier achieved. A state, for many reasons, may resist pleas to
make internal changes sufficient to give self-determination to a hitherto rights-
deprived part of its population. Thus, attempts to achieve self-determination
have many times resulted in conflict.
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During the United Nations (UN) era (1945 to present), there has been an
unprecedented increase in the number of states. Each new state has vindicated
the right of self-determination for one or more groups of people. However, it
is inaccurate to say that state creation was a legally-mandated result of self-
determination. As noted above, self-determination need not result in the
creation of a state. Moreover, self-determination has notoriously lacked
concrete legal content. In particular, it has lacked a procedural framework for
its realization.' Though the new states, which have appeared since 1945, have
vindicated the right of people to self-determination, those states did not result
directly from the right to self-determination. Most new states in fact resulted
from the process of decolonization. '
The process of decolonization is often described simply as a "retreat from
empire" or "abandonment of the colonial project." It was indeed that.
However, decolonization also involved the UN system, which responded to
and encouraged "retreat" in legally innovative ways. The process of
decolonization has been in some senses the most successful form of state-
creation yet achieved.
This is not to ignore the many difficulties faced by the new states that
resulted from decolonization. Continuing economic dependency and
susceptibility to outside political influence are notorious crises of new states.
However, it is not entirely clear that these crises resulted from the process
by which these states gained independence.
Whether formed by decolonization, consent-based processes outside the
colonial context, or secession (e.g., Bangladesh), new states have often faced
tribulation. What is clear is that, in terms of number, decolonization has been
the most productive process of state creation.
Decolonization produced more states than any other legal process; it
created them, for the most part, without interstate violence (and that at a time
when two rival superpowers competed for clients among new states).
Moreover, it created states within a well-defined UN institutional structure.
It did so in a manner widely heralded as vindicating the right of peoples to
self-determination, without revising the principle that existing states possess
a right to preserve their territorial integrity. Decolonization produced or
clarified new facts on the ground and conserved legal principles at the same
time. This article proposes that extending the UN-guided decolonization
1 See Yoram Dinstein, Is There a Right to Secede?, 90 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 296,303
(1996) ("Modem international law has created a right (self-determination) loaded with political
and psychological explosives, but it does not have an answer to the question of how that right
is going to be put into effect in the event of disagreement about its implementation.").
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process to new terrain might have provided a solution to the crisis of Kosovo
and Yugoslavia.
II. A PROBLEM OF UN POLITICS
The UN Security Council, under chapter VII of the UN Charter, is the only
organ in the UN institutional order which may authorize the use of force where
there is no immediate threat to the security of a state. A persistent problem in
this aspect of the UN security system is that the Security Council may only
authorize the use of force when all five permanent members agree to use force.
For much of the history of the UN, especially during the Cold War, political
division on the Security Council made unanimity a rarity. Even without Cold
War political friction, obtaining a Security Council mandate for use of force
has been difficult.2 A blockade by one or more Council members would
usually arise when other members proposed enforcing international law with
military measures.3 This did not always result in paralysis, as member states
on occasion attempted to enforce international law with military measures
outside the UN framework. This reliance on extra-UN processes of authority
at times could cast doubt, however, on the efficacy of the UN security system.4
By March 1999, a number of states, especially the United States and its
Western European allies, began to take the view that a situation had arisen in
the Serbian province of Kosovo that required an international response. Full
treatment of the history and politics of the situation would exceed the scope of
the present essay, so a thumbnail sketch must suffice.5
2 Because of this, the utility of the Council has come under recent scrutiny. See, e.g., Jose
E. Alvarez, Forward, What's the Security Council For?, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 221 (1996).
' See David P. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical
Conundrum, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411 (1996) (noting difficulties in obtaining Security Council
mandate and attributing them to "lack of consensus in liberal thought about the purpose and
potential of the Security Council"). Writers have proposed ending the veto power of the
permanent members on the ground that this would increase the efficacy of the Council. See,
e.g., Keith L. Sellen, The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World Order, 138
MIL. L. REV. 187, 191 (1992).
' Some actions would be described by some states as violations of law rather than
enforcement. Consider the following examples of use of force outside the UN framework: the
Soviet Union in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and
Afghanistan (1979); the United States in the Dominican Republic (1964), Grenada (1983), and
Panama (1989); South Africa in Angola and Mozambique (1975-1991).
' See generally Cable News Network, A Timeline of Tensions (visited Dec. 14, 1999)
<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/998/10/kosovo/timeline> (furnishing a timeline ofthe events
in Kosovo). The history of the region is treated in MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA:
THE THIRD BALKAN WAR (3rd rev. ed. 1996); NOEL MALCOLM, KOsoVO: A SHORT HISTORY
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The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six republics:
Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia.
The Republic of Serbia contained two semi-autonomous provinces, the
Vojvodina in the north and Kosovo in the southwest. The status of the
provinces was established under the SFRY Constitution of 1974 and seemed
suitable for accommodating the distinct ethnic identities of the provinces.6
Vojvodina had a Hungariaha minority (19 percent),7 and Kosovo had an
Albanian majority (90 percent).8 Albanian Kosovars administered Kosovo
after 1974. Friction between Albanians and Serbs nonetheless surfaced as
early as 1981 in the form of student demonstrations. Serbs in Kosovo accused
the provincial government of discriminatory practices against the Serb
minority. Kosovo at length became a cause celebrg among Serb nationalists.
Slobodan Milosevic, then head of the Republic of Serbia, capitalized on
nationalist sentiment by visiting Kosovo and promising that the Serb minority
of the province would not be ill-treated by Albanians. Serbia ended Albanian
Kosovar self-rule in 1989. The province, from then on, was administered
directly from the federal capital, Belgrade, by Serbs.
The federal government stationed a substantial army contingent and
paramilitary forces to keep order in Kosovo, and violent incidents took place
between these and Albanian Kosovars. Starting in late 1990, the institutions
of the SFRY began to erode. By winter 1991-92, the process was complete,
with most states taking the view that, by then, the SFRY had disintegrated.9
(1998); MIRANDA VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB AND ALBANIAN: A HISTORY OF KOsOVO (1998);
SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR
(1995); Kosovo: IN THE HEART OF THE POWDER KEG (Robert Elsie ed., 1997). United States
Senate and House of Representatives hearings produced two overviews of the situation: The
Crisis in Kosovo: Hearings before the Subcomm. on European Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 105th Cong. (1998); Kosovo, Current Situation and Future Options: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong. (1998).
6 See MIRANDA VICKERS, THE STATUS OF KOsOVo IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA (1994);
Constitution of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Balustein and Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1994).
' See International Crisis Group, Vojvodina, Montenegro and the Sandzak: Milosevic's
Pandora's Box in State of the Balkans (visited Dec. 14, 1999) <http://www.intl-crisis-
group.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/ba0 I main.htm>.
s See International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Savage Reality (visited Dec. 14, 1999) <http:
www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/b a0 I main.htm>.
9 See generally Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution ofthe Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992) (summarizing the dissolution of
the SFRY). The most authoritative statement of the proposition that the SFRY had dissolved
is Opinion 8 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference for the Former Yugoslavia
(Badinter Commission). The Opinion, issued July 4, 1992, noted some aspects of the cohesion
1999]
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Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia were de facto
independent states by the summer of 1992. Kosovo, however, remained a
province of Serbia, and Serbia with Montenegro claimed to continue as a
geographically reduced but legally uninterrupted Yugoslav state, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The claim of SFRY-FRY continuity has been
rejected by writers, states, and the UN. FRY political and security institutions
nonetheless remained sufficiently robust to enable the FRY to continue to
administer Kosovo without deference to the wishes of the Albanian majority.
In 1992, Kosovo, in a referendum not recognized by the FRY government,
voted to secede from Serbia. ' The FRY then had to rely more than ever on an
armed presence to maintain its jurisdiction over Kosovo. In 1997, the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) began attacking Serb security forces and Albanians
who accommodated the FRY." The KLA gathered enough strength to take
control of some parts of the province.
Faced with a rural insurgency, in February 1998, the FRY launched a
campaign to reaffirm control of Kosovo. This resulted in the killing of civilian
Albanian Kosovars and, in turn, riots broke out. The Permanent Council of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) issued a
decision on March 11, 1998, calling on the parties in the conflict to enter into
"meaningful dialogue" and to cooperate with the OSCE in re-establishing a
verification mission in Kosovo and permitting humanitarian and relief
agencies to operate in the province.' 2 The UN Security Council noted the
of federal states generally and stated that "the SFRY no longer exists." Interlocutory Decision,
Op. No. 8, 9, & 10, 92 I.L.R. 194, 202 (Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission
1993).
0 See United States Dep't of State, Kosovo Chronology (visited May 21, 1999) <http://
www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_kosovo-timeline.html> (giving a very brief sketch of the
events leading to the current crisis).
" See International Crisis Group, Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward(visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http://www.inti-crisis-group.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/Kosi2rep.
htm> (reporting a sharp divide between the KLA's rural constituency and Kosovar townspeople
who supported the Democratic League of Kosovo and the League's moderate president, Ibrahim
Rugora).
12 See Plenary Meeting, 156 PC JOURNAL AGENDA ITEM 3 (Mar. 11, 1998) <http://www.
osceprag.cz/e/pcdec218.htm>. A previous verification mission, the OSCE Mission of Long
Duration in Kosovo, had consisted of no more than twenty verifiers. It had been authorized by
a decision of August 14, 1992, and implemented after a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
was signed with the FRY on October 28, 1992. When the FRY declined to sign an instrument
prolonging the MOU, the mission, along with two other missions on FRY territory (in the
Sanjak and the Vojvodina), was withdrawn. All three missions had been operating under the
same OSCE mandate. See The OSCE Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sanjak and
Vojvodina (last modified Nov. 26, 1998) <http://www.osceprag.cz/e/docs/surv_kos.htm>.
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OSCE statement and called for a cessation of hostilities and return of the
OSCE mission to Kosovo. 3 From May 1998 on, the Democratic League of
Kosovo-the moderate Albanian political formation in the province-held
talks with the FRY government, but these talks were intermittent and
unfortunately did not result in a durable settlement. FRY security forces
conducted an offensive against the KLA from July through September,
resulting in extensive loss of life and property in the central part of the
province. The UN Security Council in September 1998 took note of the
situation and called again for a cease-fire and political dialogue. 4 Talks in
October led to a cease-fire, and the FRY agreed, by an instrument signed on
October 16, to permit the OSCE to put in place a Kosovo Verification Mission
(KVM). 5 The Security Council endorsed the KVM in Resolution 1203.16 The
KVM deployed, amounting finally to the largest such mission in OSCE
history. 7 Violence nonetheless intensified through the autumn.
Albanian Kosovars and the FRY government began talks under western
auspices at Rambouillet, France, on February 6, 1999. The FRY did not accept
proposals that Kosovo receive a NATO peacekeeping force. However, NATO
involvement was not removed as a term of the proposed settlement. The FRY
withdrew from the talks. On March 13, a number of bombings killed ethnic
Albanians in two FRY-administered towns. Apparent breakdown of the peace
process notwithstanding, Albanian Kosovar representatives remained at
Rambouillet, and on March 18, 1999, they signed the proposed accords,
including provision for a 28,000-soldier NATO implementation force in the
province. The FRY delegation did not sign. 8
'3 See U.N. SCOR Res. 1160, 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 160 (1998).
14 See U.N. SCOR Res. 1199, 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 199 (1998) (reiterating
Resolution 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998)).
'5 See Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (visited Oct. 16, 1998) <http://
www.osceprag.cz/e/agreekos.htm>.
16 See U.N. SCOR Res. 1203, 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
"7 See id. With headquarters in the seat of provincial government, Pristina, and field offices
("coordination centers") in the capital of every administrative subunit of the province (optsina),
the KVM was permitted to include up to 2,000 unarmed verifiers. This personnel came from
OSCE member states. By February 5, 1999, the KVM had deployed 1, 125 personnel in Kosovo.
See Press Release: Overview of Countries' Representation in the Kosovo Verification Mission
(last modified Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.osceprag.cz/e/docs/presrel/kpr20-99.htm> (listing
countries contributing personnel and their numbers).
"B The full text of the draft accords, as signed by the Kosovar Albanian representatives, is
posted on the Balkan Action Council website. See Interim Agreement for Peace & Self
Government in Kosovo (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.balkanaction.org/archives/kia299.
html>. The text of the draft accords, with amendments proposed by the FRY representatives,
is also posted at the Balkan Action Council website. See Serbian Counter-Proposal to Interim
19991
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OSCE monitors evacuated Kosovo on March 20, 1999, in anticipation of
air strikes by NATO. 9 As early as October 1998, NATO member states had
authorized air strikes in the event that the FRY did not agree to curtail its
police action, did not allow the return of refugees, or did not accept unarmed
OSCE monitors-requirements enunciated by the Security Council in
Resolutions 1160 (March 31, 1998) and 1199 (September 23, 1998). The only
requirement that the FRY met was to permit deployment of the KVM, though
FRY forces allegedly obstructed the OSCE verifiers on a number of
occasions.2" The breakdown of the Rambouillet talks in March was treated as
the trigger for military action. NATO member states may well have doubted
whether the North Atlantic Council, political arm of the Alliance, had
authority to initiate an armed enforcement action against the FRY.2' A
Security Council resolution crafted specifically to allow an action enforcing
Resolutions 1160 and 1199 would have clarified the legal situation.
The Security Council, however, in all likelihood would not have authorized
action against Yugoslavia. No draft resolution was put to the Council seeking
authorization, the states moving for action likely having recognized the
improbability of gaining Council consent. 22 Instead, the locus of decision-
making shifted from the UN to a regional security organization. The decision
to initiate an armed action against Yugoslavia in response to the situation in
Kosovo took place in the North Atlantic Council, not in the UN Security
Agreement (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.balkanaction.org/archives/skia399.pdf>.
'9 See Press Release of the KVM Press Office, No. 31/99, containing statement of
Ambassador William G. Walker, KVM Head of Mission, in Pristina (Mar. 19, 1999).
20 See, e.g., KVM Protests Harassment of Verifiers (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.
osce.cz/e/kosovo.htm>. Note, however, that the Kosovo Liberation Army was also alleged to
have obstructed the OSCE mission. See Deliberate Shooting of KVM Vehicles [in area of]
Decani (visited Jan. 15, 1999) <http://www.osce.cz/e/kosovo.htm>.
2 This putative authority was exercised through a statement of the North Atlantic Council.
See Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo, NATO Press Release (99) 12, Jan. 30,
1999 (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://hq.nato.int/docu/pr/pr99e.htm>. Additional NATO press
releases also evidence this putative authority. See Statement of the North Atlantic Council on
the Situation in Kosovo, NATO Press Release (1999) 038, Mar. 22, 1999 (visited Dec. 15, 1999)
<http://www.hq.nato.int/docu/pr/pr99e.htm>; Press Statement by Doctor Javier Solana,
Secretary General ofNA TO, NATO Press Release (1999) 040, Mar. 23, 1999 (visited Dec. 15,
1999) <http://www.hq.nato.int/docu/pr/pr99e.htm>.
22 See Conflict in the Balkans: NA TO Leaders Focus on Genocide as Legal Basis for
Bombing. Ugly Word Helping to Create a New Model of Law to Justify Other, Similar
Interventions, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Apr. 9, 1999, at A 10 ("U.S. Policymakers
did not seek [Security Council] authorization, officials have acknowledged, in part because
Russia and China would be expected to veto it.").
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Council.2" Those states on the Security Council opposed to intervention
(Russia and China) protested that NATO lacked authority to approve
intervention, but NATO commenced a bombing campaign on March 24, 1999.
A number of international lawyers advocating the UN security system
characterized the NATO campaign as illegal because it fell outside the UN
institutional structure. Some of these shared their views with the press, both
through interviews and editorials, shortly after the commencement of
Operation Allied Force.24 A few even expressed the view before the action
2 The "by-pass" of UN institutions in favor of an alternative force-regulatory structure,
NATO, was recognized by the press. See Why the United Nations Was Ignored Over Kosovo:
The Prospect of a Russia Veto Justified Reliance on Another Tool, THE GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto, Can.), Mar. 29, 1999, at A 12. (The unattributed editorial article argued that although
UN authorization would be best, because of a Russian veto, NATO was the appropriate answer.)
The grounds for such a by-pass were questioned by one editorialist even before Operation Allied
Force commenced. See Jonathan D. Tepperman, Kosovo Dilemma: NA TO Alone, Without UN
Backing?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 22, 1999, at 10, available in 1999 WL 5110301 (stating
that "[b]efore NATO members give up on the United Nations and the legitimacy it confers, they
should be clearer about what exactly they are doing, and prepared for others to do likewise").
Distinguished publicists also doubted the legality of the by-pass. See Jules Lobel & Michael
Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires
and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (1999).
24 See Elizabeth Sullivan, NA TO MayBe in Violation oflnternationalLaw; Attack Counters
UN Guarantee, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Mar. 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2966422
(quoting Michael Ratner, a lawyer specializing in war-powers acts); Michael Doyle, Strike in
the Balkans, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 26, 1999, at A 12, available in 1999 WL 4016967 (quoting Ted
Galen Carter of the Cato Institute); Paul Campos, Editorial, Rule of Law Turned into Obscene
Joke, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEwS, Apr. 6, 1999, at 33A, available in 1999 WL 6645063
(Campos is director of the Byron R. White Center for American Constitutional Study at the
University of Colorado); Tepperman, supra note 23, at 10 (Tepperman is an associate editor of
Foreign Affairs); Proinsias De Rossa, Editorial, NATO's Unilateral Actions Make it Guilty of
Selective Indignation, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, available in 1999 WL 14004571 (De Rossa
was spokesperson on foreign affairs for the Irish Labor Party); Joseph W. Samuels, Letter to the
Editor, Yugoslavia Bombing Undermines UN Charter, LONDON FREE PRESS (Ont.), Mar. 31,
1999, at A14, available in 1999 WL 14869389 (Samuels is a former legal advisor to the
Canadian Red Cross); Valerie Alvord, NA TOAction Poses Dangerous Precedent, Legal Experts
Warn, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 1, 1999, at A22, available in 1999 WL 4060755 (quoting
both Robert Hayden, director of East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, and
Thomas Valasek, a research analyst at the Center for Defender Information); Michelle Shephard,
Country Violating 'Tradition of War and Peace,' Group Says, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 7, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 16004887 (quoting Douglas Roche, a former chairperson of the UN
Disarmament Committee, University of Toronto professors emeritus Ursula Franklin and
Watkins, and international lawyer David Jacobs); Ingvar Carlson & Shridath Ramphal, Editorial,
NA TO Damages International Law, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 6, 1999, at A7,
available in 1999 WL 6586882 (Carlson is a former prime minister of Sweden; Ramphal is a
former secretary-general of the commonwealth); Peter Erlinder, NATO Action Unwisely
1999]
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began that such an action would be illegal. Mary Ellen O'Connell stated
shortly before Operation Allied Force that NATO action without the mandate
of the UN would be illegal.25 Michael Byers stated at a 1999 American
Society of International Law Conference that Operation Allied Force is a clear
violation of the UN Charter and that the crisis in Kosovo should be addressed
by prosecuting individual war criminals. 26 Bruno Simma of the University of
Munich called NATO action a breach of the article 2(4) prohibition on use or
threat of force.27
Though not calling Operation Allied Force illegal, UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan did state that the Security Council should have been involved in
the decision to commence the action at arms.28 Allan Gerson of the Council
of Foreign Relations also did not call the action illegal, saying nonetheless that
it "flout[ed] the traditional interpretation of the [UN] charter., 29  Ruth
Wedgewood of the Yale Law School also noted that lack of a UN mandate was
problematic, even if it did not render the action illegal. "The old presump-
tion," Wedgewood remarked, "is that you would go to the UN Security
Council for a blessing., 30 Christoph H. Schreuer, professor of international
law at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, and Anthony Arend, professor of government at Georgetown
University, also noted problems in using force outside of the UN system.3 '
Indeed, the tension between sanctity of UN institutions and humanitarianism
Undercuts UN, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 4, 1999, at 19A, available in 1999 WL
7492292 (Erlinder is a professor at William Mitchell College of Law and a past president of the
National Lawyers Guild).
25 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Editorial, Crisis in Kosovo: Area Experts Give Perspectives
on US Strategy Toward Serbs, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 28, 1999, at BO 1, available in 1999
WL 9428865 (O'Connell is Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Cincinnati).
26 See Panel, Accountability of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, 93 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1999 (publication forthcoming).
27 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force; Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
1,5-6 (1999).
21 See Penny Kozakos, Countries Raise Chorus ofDissent: Crisis in Kosovo, USA TODAY,
Mar. 25, 1999, at 5A.
29 William Glaberson, Legal BasisforAttacks ls Shaky, Experts Say, ORANGE COUNTY REG.
(Cal.), Mar. 27, 1999, at A19, available in 1999 WL 4291632.
30 Doyle, supra note 24, at A12; see also Ruth Wedgewood, NATO's Campaign in
Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 828-34 (1999).
"' See Norman Kempster, Leaders and Scholars Clash Over Legality, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1999, at A26.
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was identified by a number of prominent writers as the heart of the legal
problem.32
Foreign affairs correspondents and editorialists in major newspapers further
noted the potential risk to UN institutional structures governing use of force.33
Doug Cassel, director at the Center for International Human Rights at
Northwestern University School of Law, noted similar threats to the integrity
of the UN system.3 4
The general view of these publicists is that to conduct an intervention
without the mandate of the Security Council was to vitiate the United Nations
security order, which all UN member states were obliged to support by virtue
of their ratification of the UN Charter. In response, advocates of the NATO
action called Operation Allied Force argued that circumstances in Kosovo
were exigent and that political blockades in the Security Council could not be
permitted to prevent international enforcement action in cases of clear
breaches of humanitarian law.
Some also argued that a UN mandate did in fact exist in the form of
Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199. United States Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright expressed this view.35
The resolutions, however, furnished at best a rather tenuous mandate, and
reliance on such non-specific "permissions" for the use of force has been
heavily criticized.36
32 See, e.g., Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A 'Good' or 'Bad' War?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
841-47 (1999); Jonathan I. Chamey, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 837-41 (1999). Chinkin appears to lean toward the view that the humanitarian
imperative was well-served, even if by measures that raised acute problems of legality. Charney
takes the view that Operation Allied Force was in balance a violation of international law.
"' See James L. Hirsen, Editorial, NA TO Is Violating the Law, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.),
Apr. 6, 1999, at B06, available in 1999 WL 4293424; Editorial, Kosovo War's Heavy Toil,
BOSTON GLOBE, at A 12, available in 1999 WL 6054952; Marcus Gee, Analysis, Canada's Part
in Bombing Violates 50-Year Tradition, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 30, 1999, at A16;
Gordon Barthos, Insight, The Worst Nightmare, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 27, 1999, available in
1999 WL 14317598; William Drozdiak, Kosovo Attack Transforms NA TO for the 21st Century,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 2', 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 7670172; David Usborne
& Phil Reeves, Serbia Offensive: UN Swept Aside by Bombing Strikes, INDEP. (London), Mar.
25, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 5990543; Andreas Whittam Smith, Comment, We Should
Not Break the Law in Order to Impose the Law, INDEP. (London), Mar. 29, 1999, at 4, available
in 1999 WL 5991237.
"4 See Doug Cassel, Commentary, International Coup d'Etat in Kosovo, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
28, 1999, § 1, at 21.
5 See Sullivan, supra note 24.
36 See, e.g., Lobel & Ratner, supra note 23, at 124.
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Most of those publicists who expressed the view that use of force against
Yugoslavia was legal, grounded the view on the law of humanitarian
intervention arguing that humanitarian concerns trumped the right to territorial
integrity.37
Lawyers advancing the two positions in at least one respect argued past one
another.38 The view that the NATO action was illegal depended on the
assumption that such action required the operation of the institutional
apparatus contained within the UN system for regulating use of force.
Advocates of the NATO action, by contrast, assumed that while it was perhaps
desirable when conducting armed enforcement action to do so within the UN
security framework, the framework was not essential if political division
within it prevented necessary action. Advocates of both positions would
concur, however, that Operation Allied Force was prosecuted essentially
31 See Christopher Greenwood, Conflict in the Balkans: The Case Against Slobodan:
International Law: Yes, But Is the War Legal? Has NATO the Right to Intervene? THE
OBSERVER, Mar. 28, 1999, at 22, available in 1999 WL 13401370 (Greenwood is a barrister
active in international law cases and a professor of law at the London School of Economics);
John Strawson, Letter, NA TO Action Is Legal, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 31, 1999, at
2, available in 1999 WL 15735634 (Strawson is a Senior Lecturer in Law at University of East
London); Neil A. Lewis, Genocide Treaty Could Justify Military Intervention, THE NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 31, 1999, at A2, available in 1999 WL 4405387 (citing Gidon
Gottlieb, University of Chicago); Neil A. Lewis, Conflict in the Balkans: NA TO Leaders Focus
on Genocide as Legal Basisfor Bombing; Ugly Words Helping to Create a New Model of Law
to Justify Other, Similar Interventions, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Apr. 9, 1999, at
A 10 (quoting Diane Orentlicher, American University); Tom Mashberg, Experts Wrestle with
Morality of Kosovo War, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 3394477
(quoting Charles S. Rudnick, Chicago-Kent). The view was picked up by the press and
expressed widely on editorial pages. See Clifford Longley, Sacred and Profane: No Hiding
Placefor the Mass Murders; Morality Is Best When Founded on Clear Rational Principles, THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 9, 1999, available in 1999 WL 16618526; Jonathan S.
Landay, 'Genocide'Label Could Bring Ground War, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 29,
1999, at 7 (quoting Claudio Grossman, American University).
" See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 44-45 (1986) (discussing what it means for two
discussants to argue past one another).
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outside the institutional 9 structure which the UN system provided for the use
of force.40
A question presented by the Kosovo action is whether, despite the political
blockade on the Security Council, international intervention might have been
orchestrated within the UN institutional structure. I will argue that it may
indeed have been possible to develop an approach which would have taken
place within the UN institutional structure yet avoided the Security Council
political blockade that compelled resort to extra-UN institutions.
III. A PROBLEM OF RIGHTS AND STATEHOOD
The Kosovo action, as noted above, raised a problem over UN governance
of the use of force. It also raised a problem over rights and statehood. On the
one hand, groups of human beings enjoy certain collective rights involving
their relations to the states in which they live and to international society. On
the other hand, international order, if no longer consisting entirely or even
chiefly of states, still relies in crucial ways on states,4 and states, reflecting
their role in international order, possess, it is said, a right to maintain their
territorial integrity. These considerations, as noted in the introduction, may be
seen as flip sides of the same coin. Operation Allied Force brought the tension
between rights and statehood into sharp relief.
Self-determination has been a recurring concept in discussions of the
relationship between states and the human beings they govern. The Wilsonian
origins of self-determination and its great false start at the end of World War
I are ably recounted elsewhere.42 Suffice it to say that self-determination has
'9 The word "institutional" is important here. NATO countries took the position that
Operation Allied Force was very much consistent with the principles of the UN Charter and with
specific resolutions of the Security Council regarding Yugoslavia and Kosovo in particular. It
may well have been. But this is distinct from whether the decision to take action took place
within those UN institutions designed to govern use of force and collective enforcement. It is
beyond the scope of this essay to inquire whether, under international law, actions consistent
with legal principles can be legal if they violate procedural rules.
40 This is not to ignore that advocates of the NATO action also drew attention to the two
Security Council resolutions calling for peaceful settlement of the Kosovo crisis-Resolutions
1160 and 1199. See Res. 1160, supra note 13; Res. 1199, supra note 14. Despite these
resolutions, there was no explicit UN authorization.
4' See, e.g., Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 403 (1999).
42 See JORRI DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-
STATES: SELF-DETERMINATION AND STATEHOOD 7-27 (1996); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 11-33 (1995) (noting Enlightenment and
nineteenth century roots of self-determination); see also Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-
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resonated as a political principle and gained a sure position in both the rhetoric
of international relations and in the politics of group rights, yet its status as a
legal rule has been uncertain. While it is widely agreed that certain groups
of human beings (usually those thought to constitute a "people") 44 possess a
right to self-determination, there is little consensus as to what actions such
groups may lawfully undertake to vindicate that right. Still less clear may be
what actions third parties (i.e., parties other than the party asserting a right to
self-determination and other than the party against which the right is claimed)
may take to assist in vindicating the right. It has been said that the right to
self-determination equates to a right to establish a state. This view, however,
was the first associated with self-determination to be refuted. 45 Self-determi-
nation indeed entails something about statehood, but it has not meant that
every group of human beings who constitute a distinct ethnic community has
a right to establish its own state.46 Achieving self-determination through
determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993); Richard A. Falk, The Right of Self-determination
Under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience, in
SELF-DETERMINATION AND SELF-ADMINISTRATION: A SOURCEBOOK 47-78 (Wolfgang
Danspeckgruber & Arthur Watts eds., 1997) (discussing in particular post-Cold War state
practice with commentary by Ruth Lapidoth and Hisashi).
4 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 595 (4th ed. 1990);
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1979) (discussing the
debate over self-determination).
44 See Duursma, supra note 42, at 44-46, 71-77 (discussing the definition of "people").
45 Problems with extending to every ethnic group a right to establish a state were recognized
at the time Woodrow Wilson declared self-determination a principle of American foreign policy.
Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, warned, "The phrase is simply loaded with
dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives
... What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!" ROBERT
LANSING, THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 97-98 (1921). Not long after
he put it in print, the League of Nations, through a commission of jurists, bore Lansing's
warning in mind. In the Alands arbitration, it was held that a group of islands in the Gulf of
Bothnia between Finland and Sweden, though under Finnish jurisdiction but inhabited by
persons of Swedish ethnic origin and language, did not have a right to secede from Finland. The
Alanders instead became a self-governing unit within Finland with special controls regarding
residency to preserve the ethnic identity of their islands. Self-determination, as is typical, was
realized there not through creation of a new state but through participation in governance of an
existing state. See Aaland Islands, LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL, O.J. Supp. 3, at 5
(1920) ("Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to
separate themselves from the State of which they form a part by the simple expression of a
wish."); CASSESE, supra note 42, at 27-31.
46 See Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 457,471
(1991); Emilio J. Cdrdenas & Maria Femanda Cafids, The Limits of Self-determination, in SELF-
DETERMINATION AND SELF-ADMINISTRATION: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 42, at 153,159 ("Self-
determination must not be used as an instrument to achieve secession; therefore, autonomy is
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creation of a new state conflicts with the right of existing states to preserve
their territorial integrity.
The right to territorial integrity runs to all states and is more strongly
installed in law and in practice than any right to establish a new state.47
Indeed, preservation of territorial integrity is the object for which the UN
Charter permits states an exception to the otherwise extensive limitation on use
or threat of force. International instruments which create or codify rights on
the part of communities or individuals within states frequently carry provisos
that those rights in no way derogate the right of states to maintain territorial
integrity." States taking an interest in crises inside the borders of other states
note that any solution must not infringe on the right of those states to territorial
integrity. Very few states have been created since World War II without the
the means of upholding the necessary balance between various communities or minorities in a
pluralistic society. A full exercise of ... self-determination should not result in having to
recognize independent statehood for each and every individual group or unit."); Daniel Tharer,
National Minorities: A Global, European and Swiss Perspective, 19 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD
AFF. 53 (1955); Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson, The International Law
Commission's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: An Appraisal
of the Substantive Provisions, 5 CRIM. L.F. 1, 32-33 (1994) ("Beyond these situations, no
customary right to self-determination has been recognized by the international community.
Indeed, there remains a strong proscription under international law against the right of secession.
The preservation of states' territorial integrity is of paramount concern both strategically and
legally."); Richard F. Iglar, Comment, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the
International Law of Self-determination: Slovenia and Croatia'sRight to Secede, 15 B.C. INT'L
& COMp. L. REv. 213 (1992). Perhaps the best recent treatment of the limits of self-determina-
tion in relation to creation of new states is by James Crawford, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. (publication
forthcoming 1999) (based on opinion in the Canadian Supreme Court Quebec Reference).
"' See DUUPRSMA, supra note 3 1, at 77-84 (discussing the balance between self-determina-
tion and territorial integrity).
48 See G.A. Res 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., at para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV)
(1970). ("Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed, or color.").
"' The narrowness of the application of self-determination and strength of the countervailing
principle of territorial integrity is evident in the ongoing crisis over Chechnya, an entity which
seceded from the Russian Federation. For the French reaction to the 1994-95 Chechen crisis,
see 41 Annuaire Francais de Droit International 911 (1995) (respecting territorial integrity as
a foundation of international law).
The British reaction was more subdued:
[T]he exercise of the right [of self-determination] must also take into
account questions such as what constitutes a separate people and respect for
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consent of a parent state.50 Another feature of state practice further illustrating
the strength of the rule of territorial integrity is that a state may permit a
community in its territory to become a new state, but lacking permission, the
community must bow to the parent state's right to territorial integrity.
Despite these demands, claims to independent statehood have abounded
since World War I. Over one hundred of these have resulted in the formation
of new states. In virtually every case, the advent of a new state was heralded
as a vindication of the principle of self-determination." Thus, it would seem
that the principle of self-determination has taken on legal force.
Again, as noted above, the difficult question is not whether self-determina-
tion confers some general right as a matter of law. The difficult question is
what particular right self-determination confers and how that right can be
enforced in practice. In a stable, democratic state that does not practice legal
discrimination and permits its constituent ethnic groups to realize their identity
free from legal impediment, ethnic groups exercise their right to self-
determination through their participation in the governance of the state. This
may be confirmed perhaps by a referendum giving the ethnic group the chance
to alter the governing arrangement in countries like Quebec, Scotland, and
Puerto Rico. In countries where the self-determination of a minority is in
doubt, one solution may be to amend constitutional instruments so as to
the principle [of] territorial integrity of the unitary state. In the case of
Chechnya no country has recognized President Dudayev's unilateral
declaration of independence, but we have repeatedly called on the Russians
to work for a political solution which would allow the Chechen people to
express their identity within the framework of the Russian Federation.
563 PARL. DEB. It. L. (th ser.) 476 (1995), reprinted in 66 BIuT. Y.B. INT'L L. 621 (1995).
The United States similarly emphasized territorial integrity over self-determination:
We support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federa-
tion . . . We oppose attempts to alter international boundaries by force,
whether in the form of aggression by one state against another or in the form
of armed secessionist movements such as the one led by Dzhokhar Dudayev.
That is why we have said from the beginning that we regard Chechnya as a
matter which the Russian Government and the people of Chechnya will have
to resolve together peacefully by political means.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Supporting Democracy and Economic Reform in the
New Independent States, 6 U.S. STATE DEP'T DISPATCH 119, 120 (1995).
50 See CASSESE, supra note 42, at 123 (explaining that Bangladesh may be the only
successful example).
"' See, e.g., Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore
Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECO WAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14




reinforce minority rights. Self-determination may allow a people to experi-
ence a certain level of autonomy within the state they inhabit and to experience
legal safeguards when they are a minority in the state. Consider, for example,
Croatia. The EC/EU compelled Croatia to incorporate safeguards into its
constitution to protect a Serb minority. Indeed, minority rights treaties have
been a far more common form of vindication of the self-determination rights
of minorities than secession.52 It is highly unlikely that a group in such a
country may exercise its right to self-determination through violent revolt or
unilateral secession. The right to self-determination is not always a right to
secede.53
DOES THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION EVER EQUATE TO A RIGHT TO
SECEDE?
Secession is the unilateral severance of ties between a community and the
territory it inhabits from a state by which it was hitherto governed. As such,
52 See Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on Relations Between the
European Community and the Republics of the Former Yugoslavia, 1992 O.J. ( C 176) 5; see
also Declaration of Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the
Soviet Union, reprinted in Danilo Turk, Recognition of States: A Comment, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L.
66, Annex. 1 (1993); A.V. Lowe & Colin Warbrock, Recognition of States, 41 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 473, 477 (1992) (discussing formal guidelines on recognition of new states in Eastern
Europe and Soviet Union). For a history of minority rights treaties, see Barbara Mikotajczyle,
Universal Protection of Minorities' Selected Problems, 20 POL. Y.B. INT'L L. (1993).
13 See K.N. Blay, Self-determination Versus Territorial Integrity in Decolonization
Revisited, 25 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 386 (1985). One commentator noted:
There simply is no right of secession under international law, nor has there
been even preliminary agreement on the criteria that might be used in the
future to determine when secession should be supported. Of course, there
is no prohibition in international law against secession, either. If a country
disintegrates as the result of a civil war, international law poses no barrier
to recognition of the two or more succeeding states. That is, however, a
quite different position than recognizing the right of a group to secede from
an existing state.
Hurst Hannum, Symposium on the Future of International Human Rights: The Right of Self-
determination in the Twenty-First Century, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 773, 776 (1998). The
exception that Hannum notes of a country disintegrating is the breakup of Yugoslavia. See
Vladislav Jovanovic, The Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations,
21 FORDtIAM INT'L L. J. 1719, 1721 (1998). Jovanovic, the Yugoslav ambassador to the United
Nations, explains that the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be
properly spoken of as having "seceded" from the SFRY; they were new states emerging from
the dissolution of the constitutional system that had hitherto bound them together in another,
now existent state.
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secession does not involve the consent of the parent state, and it derogates the
territorial integrity of the parent state. Secession has rarely in the UN era
resulted in the lasting establishment of a new state. Attempts at secession
failed in Katanga and Biafra. When Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration
of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1964, the act was almost universally
judged illegal (albeit not only because it was an act of secession). Rhodesia
under its UDI was a state with an African majority but ruled by a tiny minority
of European settlers. That post-UDI Rhodesia distributed citizenship rights
(including the right to vote, freedom of movement, and access to schooling and
other public resources) on the basis of race was the chief reason the state was
never formally recognized by other states and was by 1981 compelled to
comprehensively change its constitutive basis. It submitted briefly again de
jure to British rule and then became an independent state under the title
Zimbabwe. Secession arguably resulted only once since 1945 in a secure new
state-Bangladesh. The vast majority of new states created between 1945 and
1989 did not result from secession.54 Instead, the creation of states in that
period was usually the result of a legal decolonization process closely
governed by the UN. To assess the parameters of self-determination and, in
particular, to determine what actions find legal validation under the title of
self-determination, it is necessary to examine how decolonization produced
new states. I will argue below that it is within the process of decolonization
that there may have been an alternative approach to the crisis in Kosovo.
IV. DECOLONIZATION
When the period immediately after the Second World War
ended, self-determination was understood to fundamentally
mean 'achieving independence from colonial domination.' It
certainly proved to be an important tool through which
colonization almost vanished from our world. . . Self-
determination-with its caveats-provided the legal founda-
tion for decolonization.55
Self-determination, indeed, has been the source of legal principles leading
to independence for colonial countries. But it was certainly not the "tool."
Decolonization was the tool that made self-determination work. To be sure,
"4 See Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16
YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991) (discussing self-determination and its relationship to secession).
"S Cirdenas & Cafids, supra note 46, at 153, 155.
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decolonization is not the only tool that has made self-determination work. In
many cases, self-determination has been effectuated through consent of the
parties involved. Indeed, most of the new states created since the end of the
Cold War have resulted from a process of consent between the claimants to
statehood and the parent state.56 At its outset, decolonization, too, was
essentially a consent-based process, but (as I will describe shortly) decoloniza-
tion within the framework of UN institutions was developed into something
more.
Decolonization began in earnest after World War II when European powers
in possession of a substantial portion of the world's land surface began to give
up the colonial enterprise that had led them to that possession. The post-World
War II process of decolonization was not smooth in all cases. In a number of
countries, costly anti-colonial wars marked the end of European dominion.
Declarations of independence in some cases came without the consent of the
colonial power and were met with violence. Curiously, the legal nature of
decolonization was such that few if any instances of state creation through
decolonization are properly spoken of as cases of secession. More curiously
still, in some instances, independence was achieved through armed conflict,
sometimes supported by outside powers, and neither the uprisings nor the
external aid rendered to them was properly termed a violation of the territorial
integrity of the parent state. To understand these seeming paradoxes, it is
necessary to understand how the UN regulated the process of decolonization.
The process of decolonization was thoroughly integrated into and
monitored by the UN system. Under the Charter, this was accomplished by
reference to two types of colonial territories. Chapter XII of the UN Charter
provided a framework for territories formerly under the system of Mandates
established by article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Chapter
XI dealt with the substantially more numerous colonial territories classified by
the UN as non-self-governing territories (NSGTs). The situation in which self-
determination has had its clearest legal link to the formation of new states is
that of NSGTs. Article 73 of the UN Charter defines NSGTs as "territories
whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." The
first territories designated NSGTs were possessions of Australia, Belgium,
France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. These powers voluntarily admitted the territories to the UN r6gime.
6 See Crawford, supra note 46 (noting that even the Baltic States, widely viewed as having
simply reclaimed an independence put in abeyance by illegal Soviet annexation, may owe their
post-Cold War independence to a process of consent).
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However, Portugal and Spain, members of the UN from 1955, did not
volunteer to admit their colonies as NSGTs. The General Assembly, in
response to this, set forth criteria for NSGTs in Resolution 1541 (XV) (1960)."
Since then, the Assembly has declared certain territories NSGTs despite the
resistance or lack of consent of the administering colonial power.58 This
marked an important evolution in the UN decolonization process.
NSGTs, whether voluntarily designated by the administering power or
mandated by the General Assembly, are the territories to which self-determina-
tion most clearly applies as a principle that may lead to the establishment of
new states. According to the International Court of Justice in its Namibia
Opinion:
[T]he subsequent development of international law in regard
to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter
of the United Nations, made the principle of self determina-
tion applicable to all of them. 9
At the same time, the Court emphasized that the NSGT r6gime is one
concerning colonies: "[I]t clearly embraced territories under a colonial r6gime
... A further important stage in this development was the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960), which embraces all
peoples and territories which 'have not yet attained independence.' "6 To
date, the r6gime indeed has never been extended to territories geographically
integral to a state. The major restriction of the UN decolonization process was
the requirement that it be applied only to noncontiguous colonial possessions.
Interestingly enough, the limiting rule was cemented in the same General
Assembly resolution that turned the NSGT designation process from a
voluntary to a potentially mandatory one. The legal process of decolonization
arguably underwent its most substantial extension to date when the General
7 G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
5' The latest territory to be admitted to the NSGT rdgime without the administering power's
consent was the French Pacific colony New Caledonia. G.A. Res. 41/41A, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess. Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/41A (Dec. 2, 1986).
'9 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 6 (June 21).
'' Id. at 31.
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Assembly adopted Resolution 1541 (XV) on December 15, 1960;61 yet in the
same resolution the parameters of the process were strictly set.
Under Resolution 1541 (XV), a Special Committee would assess whether
a territory was an NSGT and thus a subject requiring transmission of
information. The resolution specified two elements that, prima facie, show an
obligation to transmit information. If the territory under alien administration
is (a) geographically separate and (b) ethnically and/or culturally distinct, then
the territory is an NSGT."2 The first element, geographic separation, has been
called the "saltwater rule"; 63 only territories outre-mer' can be addressed
under the decolonization regime in its current form. The second, arguably
more malleable criterion, has not generally been viewed as an objective limit
(though it may be that the General Assembly has exercised some reserve in
assessing whether ethnic or cultural distinction obtains in a given population).
After establishing that the territory in question is geographically separate
and ethnically and/or culturally distinct from the administering power, a
claimant may then use other factors to disprove or support the presumption
that an obligation to report exists. Other factors might include aspects of
administration, politics, judicial system, economy, or history.65 At the end of
the day, the General Assembly decides the case. When introduced in the
1960s, this amounted to a new system. Whereas before the colonial powers
would voluntarily designate territories as NSGTs, after Resolution 1541 the
General Assembly would designate territories NSGTs, whether or not the
administering power consented to the designation and the obligations that it
entailed.
61 See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 57 (Principles which should guide Members in
determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information calledfor under
Article 73(e) of the Charter).
6 See G.A. Res. 1541, U.N.GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16,948th plen. mtg. at 153, U.N.
Doc. A/4684, at 29 (1960).
63 See Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-determination in the Post-
ColonialAge, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255,272 (1996); McCormack & Simpson, supra note 46, at
33-34 (discussing article 18 of the draft, making "colonial domination" a crime). The saltwater
rule has sometimes been attended by a related "pigmentation" rule. See Allen Buchanan, Self-
determination and the Right to Secede, 45 J. INT'L. AFF. 347, 349 (1992). Buchanan notes that
"[states] concoct[ed] the notorious 'saltwater' and 'pigmentation' tests: the former requiring
oceanic separation between the secessionists and the state from which they secede, the latter that
the secessionists be of a different color from those from whom they seek to secede." Id.
64 CASSELL'S FRENCH-ENGLISH/ENGLISH FRENCH DICTIONARY 532 (Denis Girard ed.,
1982). The term is usually used in association with France, thus "La France d'outre-mer."
65 See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 62, at Principle V.
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As noted above, the new system was first put into practice in Resolution
1542(XV), which determined that Portugal's overseas territories were NSGTs.
This effectuated a change in legal status for Cape Verde, Guinea, Sao Tom6
et Principe, Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda, Angola and its Cabinda enclave,
Mozambique, Goa and its dependencies, Macao, and East Timor. A Special
Committee on Territories Under Portuguese Administration was established
during the next General Assembly session.66 Further territories declared
NSGTs absent administering power consent included the Spanish overseas
possessions,67 Southern Rhodesia,68 the New Hebrides, 69 French Somaliland,
70
the Comoros,7' and New Caledonia.72
Once a territory is designated an NSGT, its administering power faces a
number of obligations alluded to above. Article 73, chapter XI of the UN
Charter indicates that states administering NSGTs "recognize the principle that
the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount. 73 Adminis-
tering states, under article 73, further must "promote to the utmost, within the
system of international peace and security established by the [UN Charter], the
well-being of the inhabitants of these territories., 74 The Charter elaborates
upon this general requirement in the form of five specific obligations:
to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples
concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational
advancement, theirjust treatment, and their protection against
abuses;
6 See G.A. Res. 1699, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 1083rd plen. mtg. at 268,
U.N. Doc. A/5100, at 38 (1961).
67 See G.A. Res. 1542, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16,948th plen. mtg. at 154, U.N.
Doc. A/4684, at 30 (1960).
"s See G.A. Res. 1747, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17A, 1121st plen. mtg. at 303,
U.N. Doc. A/5I100/Add.1, at 3 (1962).
'9 See G.A. Res. 2069, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, 1398th plen. mtg. at 155,
U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 58 (1965).
70 See G.A. Res. 2228, U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 6, 1500th plen. mtg. at 188, U.N.
Doc. A/6316, at 72 (1966).
71 See G.A. Res. 3161, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, 2202th plen. mtg. at 479,
U.N. Doc. A/9030, at 109 (1973).
'2 See G.A. Res. 41/41A, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, 948th plen. mtg. at 153,
U.N. Doc. A/4684, at 29 (1960).




to develop self-government, to take due account of the
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the
progressive development of their free political institutions,
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and
its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
to further international peace and security;
to promote constructive measures of development, to encour-
age research, and to co-operate with one another and, when
and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies
with a view to the practical achievement of the social,
economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information
purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitu-
tional considerations may require, statistical and other
information of a technical nature relating to economic, social,
and educational conditions in the territories for which they are
respectively responsible."
The UN process of decolonization became a powerful tool for obtaining
self-governance for territories and peoples under alien rule. Whether the
process might be extended to geographically integral parts of a state is
uncertain; but, as I will argue shortly, in view of the history of the develop-
ment of the legal institution of decolonization, such extension is by no means
excluded. Just as important for our discussion, NSGTs are the only territories
over which the principle of self-determination may, under certain circum-
stances, produce a right to secession and a right to use force to promote the
secessionist program. This means that the process designating territories
NSGTs has a profound impact as regards the rights of the ethnic groups in
territories so designated and equal impact as regards the rights of the states
claiming title to such territories. It also highlights that, outside that process,
the right of a people to assert self-determination through secession is
extremely limited, if it exists at all.
"[T]he fears of claims for secession based on self-determination for
minority or other groups," Dominic McGoldrick writes, "remains an
75 id.
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overriding concern for many States."76 Particular international instruments,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), may
provide for special rights for minorities of various kinds," but, in their
provisions guaranteeing territorial integrity and limiting those rights to
internal self-determination, they reflect the prevailing conservatism.
Minorities may enjoy international legal protections, but a right to secede in
most situations is not one of them. According to McGoldrick, communica-
tions to the International Commission of Jurists during drafting of the ICCPR
made clear the belief by many states that self-determination was of limited
scope in law." Self-determination, though a principle of some general force,
is not then, freestanding, a potent legal process. The mechanism by which so
many states have established independence during the UN era has been the
process of decolonization. Outside that process, territorial integrity has
prevailed in almost every instance of attempted state creation.
Decolonization has a special, and narrowly circumscribed, relationship with
self-determination. The designation of a territory as an NSGT had a
transformative effect on the territory. Before designation, the territory was
juridically indistinguishable from the metropolitan or parent state (unless that
state wished a different arrangement). But after designation, the territory took
on a new status distinct from its metropolitan or parent state. Before
designation, removal of the territory from metropolitan jurisdiction, absent
metropolitan consent, would have violated the territorial integrity of the parent
state, but, after designation, removal produced no violation whatsoever. This
was made particularly clear where the colonial power claimed that its colonies
were integral parts of the metropolitan territory. Portugal, for example, treated
Angola and Mozambique as "overseas provinces." Rejection of the legal
fiction did not alone remove the practical grounding for continued Portuguese
administration, but it did erode the presumption of territorial integrity favoring
76 DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 257 (1991).
77 The ICCPR reads in pertinent part, "In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language." International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
78 See id. at 268 n. 115 (replying to query from Rosalyn Higgins regarding secessionist
claims by Casamance). A Senegalese official stated, "[T]he right to secession, ought not be
likened to a principle of international law. As for the first element of article I [of ICCPR], it in
fact referred to a colonial situation. However, no colonial situation existed in Casamance." Id.
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continuation. With that presumption eroded, the principle of self-determina-
tion might then lead to independent statehood for the colonies.
It is misleading to say that colonies simply exercised a free-standing right
to self-determination and that it was this right alone that accounted for the
creation of states in the wake of colonial empires. Decolonization indeed
involved self-determination, for this was the principle that decolonization
sought to effectuate. It was also the principle that required the inhabitants of
the territory be left to freely decide their political disposition once the rule of
territorial integrity was rendered inapplicable to the territory in question. But
it was only after the presumption of territorial integrity was displaced that self-
determination had an unimpeded path. Without the special juridical status
colonies possessed as NSGTs, self-determination would have confronted the
legally robust principle of territorial integrity and, in short, led nowhere. The
process of decolonization produced a great efflorescence of states. By
contrast, polities that attempted to establish states against the wishes of the
parent state and outside the context of chapter 11 and decolonization seldom
succeeded. 79 Assertions of the right to self-determination by polities seeking
to establish new states against the wishes of parent states worked best (indeed,
almost worked only) within the process of decolonization. This attests to the
legal force of NSGT status.
V. EXTENDING THE PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION
Could, then, the decolonization process regulate latter-day claims to
statehood? It possessed, in its original application, two great virtues. First, it
kept state-creation and self-determination within the institutional framework
of the United Nations. Second, it displaced the presumption of territorial
integrity as regarded the colony while preserving the presumption as regarded
the metropolitan state. If the UN process of decolonization could have been
79 Bangladesh is often cited as the rare case of success. See Simpson, supra note 63, at 263
n.39. Failed attempts at secession, by contrast, are numerous. Consider Katanga (from Congo),
Biafra (from Nigeria), Kashmir (from India), East Punjab (from India), the Karen and Shan
states (from Burma), the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and its continuation the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (from Cyprus), Tamil Elam (from Sri Lanka), the South Sudan
(from Sudan), Somaliland (from Somalia), Bougainville (from Papua New Guinea), Kurdistan
(from Iraq and Turkey), the Republika Srpska (from Bosnia-Herzegovina), Abkhazia (from
Georgia), South Ossetia (from Georgia), Nagomy-Kharabakh (from Azerbaijan), and the
Democratic Republic of Yemen (from Yemen). Even where a polity has wrested effective
control of part of the territory of the "parent" state, international recognition has not been
forthcoming. The law is extremely conservative of territorial integrity.
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extended to Kosovo, the two conundrums raised by Operation Allied Force
might well have been avoided.
Extending the process of decolonization to Kosovo would have required a
major evolution in the process, namely, removal of the "saltwater" rule. Yet
the law of decolonization has not been static. The post-1945 development of
the law has been rapid, and it may as yet be incomplete. Decolonization, even
as a process limited to the special case of NSGTs as defined by Resolution
1541, has proven a potent trump of vested rights. Few doubted the validity of
European title to most of Africa and much of the Caribbean, Asia, and
Australasia before World War II, but few colonies remained in European
hands thirty years later. The limit on the process has been that it applies only
to territories defined as NSGTs. The way in which the UN defines NSGTs,
however, underwent at least one major transition during the years of decoloni-
zation. At the outset of the UN Charter era, decolonization operated only with
the consent of the colonial power."0 After 1960, it operated even in the face of
systematic obstruction. An indication of the shift was the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."' This was a
"0 This was the system stemming from U.N. CHARTER art. 73. Member states administering
colonies designated NSGTs held them in "sacred trust" and committed to (1) the political,
economic, social, and educational advancement of the peoples therein; (2) development of self-
government; and (3) regular transmission to the Secretary-General of reports on each NSGT.
U.N. CHARTER art. 73, para. I. For the last UN administrative year before what was arguably
the watershed in decolonization practice (the advent of nomination of NSGTs without
administering power consent), several administering powers transmitted information under
article 73(e) for the following territories: Australia, regarding Papua and the Cocas (Keeling)
Islands; Belgium, regarding the Belgian Congo; France, regarding the New Hebrides
(administered in condominium with the United Kingdom); the Netherlands, regarding
Netherlands New Guinea; New Zealand, regarding the Cook Islands, Niue Island, and the
Tokelau Islands; the United Kingdom, regarding the Aden Colony and Protectorate, the
Bahamas, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Bermuda, British Guiana, British Honduras, the British
Soloman Islands, British Somaliland, the British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cyprus, the Falkland
Islands and dependencies, Fiji, the Gambia, Gibraltar, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Hong
Kong, Kenya, Malta, Mauritius, the New Hebrides (administered in condominium with France),
Nigeria, North Borneo, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Pitcaim Island, St. Helena and
dependencies, Sarawak, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, the West Indies
(Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago), Uganda, and Zanzibar; and the United States of
America, regarding American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. See Information on Non-
Self-Governing Territories Transmitted under Article 73e of United Nations Charter,
Transmission of Information in 1960, 1960 U.N.Y.B. 502.
"i See G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960)
(the General Assembly "[s]olemnly proclaim[ed] the necessity of bringing to a speedy and
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations" [emphasis added]). The
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momentous transition, eventuated by increase in number of former colonies in
the General Assembly and also by crystallizing of conviction in other member
States that colonialism no longer was tenable or desirable. The resultant
development of the process of decolonization introduced a mandatory aspect,
whereas the process initially relied essentially on consent. General Assembly
recognition of national liberation movements,82 most of which were carrying
on armed resistance against colonial administrations, illustrated pointedly the
transition from consent to mandate. It would require a transition of similar
magnitude for the UN independence process to reach territories like
Kosovo-not voluntarily admitted by the metropolitan state as a proper object
of decolonization and not geographically distinct from the metropole.
For such a transition to take place, there would have to crystallize in state
practice and informed opinion a belief that the present international legal
regime does not adequately address the status of "peoples" geographically
embraced by states that govern them without consent and a belief that
international law could address that status.
NATO action against Yugoslavia suggests that states do indeed believe that
international law must address the status of such peoples. The earnest efforts
to do so within a legal framework attest that they also believe that international
law has the requisite capacity. However, the approach in fact taken toward
Kosovo cuts a broad swathe through existing international legal rules. By
extending the principle of humanitarian intervention, it substantially qualifies
the right of states to territorial integrity. And, by by-passing the UN Security
Council, it may well compromise legal governance of the use of force.
Extension of the UN decolonization process might well avoid both problems.
resolution further specified, in paragraph 5: "Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-
self-governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to
transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in
accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed
or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom." Note that
successive sessions of the General Assembly passed resolutions pertaining to specific colonies,
amplifying the general message of Resolution 1514. See supra notes 66-72.
82 See G.A. Res. 2918, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 311, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972) (recognizing that "the national liberation movements of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and
Cape Verde, and Mozambique are the authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the
peoples of those territories); G.A. Res. 3111, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30A, at 463,
U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add. I (1974) (recognizing the national liberation movement of Namibia);
G.A. Res. 3115, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30A, at 468, U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add.1
(1974) (recognizing the national liberation movement of Zimbabwe); G.A. Res. 3102, U.N.
GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30A, at 511, U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add.l (1974) (inviting various
national liberation movements to send representatives to international conferences).
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It would keep the management of self-determination claims within the
institutional framework of the UN. Where an administering power obstructed
the exercise of self-determination, it might even permit resort to unilateral
secession and use of force. By establishing a special juridical status-one
distinct from that of the parent state-the process would render the territorial
integrity of the administering power a non-issue.
Writers have observed that there would be a logic in extending the NSGT
concept to contiguous territories. Buchheit complained:
One searches in vain ... for any principled justification of
why a colonial people wishing to cast off the domination of
its governors has every moral and legal right to do so, but a
manifestly distinguishable minority which happens to find
itself, pursuant to a paragraph in some medieval territorial
settlement or through a fiat of the cartographers, annexed to
an independent State must forever remain without the scope
of the principle of self-determination. 3
Buchheit further reflects that:
International law is.. .asked to perceive a distinction between
the historical subjugation of an alien population living in a
different part of the globe and the historical subjugation of an
alien population living on a piece of land abutting that of its
oppressors. The former can apparently never be legitimated
by the mere passage of time, whereas the latter is eventually
transformed into a protected status quo.8
Buchheit states succinctly the rule and the paradox it raises. UN drafting
practice however further suggests that resolution of the paradox is not
impossible. Dominic McGoldrick notes that, in discussions on the Human
Rights Committee during drafting of the ICCPR, "members.. .view[ed] article
1 [of the ICCPR] as having an application outside the colonial situation."'85
Article 1 provides:
83 LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1978).
84 Id. at 18.
85 MCGOLDRICK, supra note 76, at 252, para. 5.15.
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All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
.2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their
natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obliga-
tions arising out of international economic co-operation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means
of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-
Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right,
in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations.86
State representatives in reference to article 1 adverted to internal conflicts in
Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Western Sahara, New Caledonia, and
Northern Ireland, thus implying that the article could be relevant in places
besides the overseas colonies which were the traditional context of decoloniza-
tion law. In at least one General Assembly Third Committee session, a state
representative suggested that the ambit of self-determination might be
extended beyond those situations dealt with so far by decolonization.87
Interestingly enough, as noted in a 1998 article by Benedict Kingsbury, an
early proposal to apply decolonization practice to integral as well as overseas
colonies was made in the 1950s by a European colonial power.88 The "Belgian
Thesis," as Kingsbury calls it, would have extended UN scrutiny to
nonautonomous peoples contiguous to their rulers, but the thesis was rejected,
in part because it was perceived as a "rearguard defense of European
colonialism." 89 By making the proposed decolonization system far-reaching,
8 ICCPR, supra note 77.
87 Sumnary Record of the 5th Meeting, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm. 39th Sess., 5th mtg. at 4-6,
U.N. Doc A/C. 3.39 SR.5 (1984) (statement of J. Thwaites representing the Australian position
of self-determination as a permanent right). This statement was cited with approval in
McCormack & Simpson, supra note 46, at 33 n. 102.
" Benedict Kingsbury, 'Indigenous Peoples' in International Law: A Constructivist
Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1998).
89 See id. at 439.
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Belgium may have aimed to prevent such a system from taking root in any
form. Powerful states continue, sometimes overtly, to favor the saltwater
limitation on decolonization law.'
At least one publicist has suggested that the General Assembly itself has
the discretion to extend the process of decolonization. 91 Michael Reisman
states that "while decolonization may have had a historically specific reference
for some drafters and may have been limited to South Africa, Portugese
territories, and Israel, terms such as 'self-determination' and 'freedom and
independence' are open-ended and could be applied to any group that a
majority of the General Assembly wished to indulge."92 Reisman emphasizes
the General Assembly voting procedure and leaves as speculation the limits on
decolonization. He implies that self-determination claims could be addressed
through expansion of the decolonization process. 93
A kernel may exist for yet another watershed in the legal process of
decolonization. The first was the change from decolonization as a process
essentially reliant on colonial powers volunteering territories as NSGTs to a
process initiated by the General Assembly nominating territories as NSGTs
against the wishes of the administering powers. Additionally, twenty years
before decolonization began, few colonial ministers, to paraphrase Dickens,
had doubted that things in general were settled forever. The very advent of
decolonization was a development of moment. Territories like Kosovo could
achieve NSGT status if the General Assembly waived the old requirement of
geographic remoteness of the dependent territory from the administering
power. Such waiver arguably would mark a greater watershed in decoloniza-
tion law than the transition from voluntary to compelled NSGT status. It
would open the way for international legal management of the independence
not only of Kosovo but of a number of ethnically distinct territories under alien
rule. Chechnya in Russia and the Tamil region of Sri Lanka are two examples
of particular concern. Quebec would be most unlikely to fall under the
decolonization regime, for its relationship to Canada does not contain the
pronounced elements of oppression that have justified most claims to disrupt
90 Kingsbury identifies the People's Republic of China as one such state. See id.
9' W. Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Reflections on the Ideology and
Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World Politics, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
5 (1998).




territorial integrity. But the point stands-numerous are the ethnic conflicts
that might be mediated through the decolonization process.94
VI. THE RISKS
txtending the process of decolonization to territories contiguous to the
states administering them would not be risk-free. On the one hand, it may be
that such a development in decolonization law would lead to too many
territories obtaining NSGT status. On the other hand, the process might not
be applied aggressively enough to address problems like Kosovo. I will assess
these risks in two ways. First, I will consider the factors that would militate
"' That there are a plethora of potential decolonization/self-determination cases is widely
noted. See, e.g., Gregory Marchildon & Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right of Secession Under
Canadian and International Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 583, 601 n.77 (1992) (noting Biafra,
Katanga, Eritrea, Bangladesh, Kurdistan, the Basque region, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Tibet,
the Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Slovenia, Croatia, Czechoslovakia, and Quebec);
Richard Perry, The Logic of the Modern Nation-State and the Legal Construction of Native
American Tribal Identity, 28 IND. L. REv. 547, 560 (1995) (noting Scotland, Wales, Lapplands,
Friesland, Flanders, Wallonie, Brittany, Lombardy, Catalonia, Euskadi, Eritrea, Sudan, Liberia,
Angola, Cyprus, Palestine, Kurdistan, Kashmir, the Punjab, Sri Lanka, Tibet, Burma, Timor,
Peru, Guatemala, Chiapas, Quebec, California, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine,
Moldavia, Georgia, Chechnya, Ossetia (North and South), Abkhazia, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Kirgizia, Tadzikistan, Uzbekistan, Crimean Tatars, and Volga Germans); Angela M. Lloyd,
Note, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 419,
427, n.32 (1994) (noting East Timor, Tibet, and Quebec); Michael J. Kelly, Political
Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of Self-determination, and the Movements Toward Smaller,
Ethnically Homogenous States, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 209 (1999) (noting Scotland, Wales, the
Catalans, the Basques, Kashmir, Chechnya, Quebec, aboriginal peoples of Canada, Chiapas, East
Timor, Palestine, Tibet, and Kurdistan); Halim Morris, Self-determination: An Affirmative Right
or Mere Rhetoric?, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201, 201 n.2 (1997) (noting Koreans,
Vietnamese, lbos, South Sudanese, Taiwanese, Somalis, Kurds, Armenians, Germans of
Romania, Scots, Catalans, Basques, Bangalis, Northern Irish, French Canadians of Quebec,
Welsh, Lebanese, Tibetans, Bretons, Lapps, Sicilians, Corsicans, Frisians, Walloons, Alsatians,
Croatians, and indigenous peoples of the Western hemisphere); James E. Falkowski,
Secessionary Self-determination: A Jeffersonian Perspective, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 209, 209 n.3
(1991) (also noting Koreans, Vietnamese, Ibos, South Sudanese, Taiwanese, Somalis, Kurds,
Armenians, Germans of Romania, Scots, Catalans, Basques, Bangalis, Northern Irish, French
Canadians, Welsh, Lebanese, Tibetans, Bretons, Lapps, Sicilians, Corsicans, Frisians, Walloons,
Alsatians, Croatians, and indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere); Michael Curtis,
Response, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 457, 471 (1991) (noting
the Kurds, Bretons, Basques, Sikhs, and "various peoples in the Soviet Republics"); Hurst
Hannum, Remarks on International Responses to Secessionist Conflicts, 90 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PRoC. 296,297 (1996) (listing countries where secessionist claims have been made as Congo,
Nigeria, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Burma, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain,
Ethiopia, Turkey, and Iraq).
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for and against NSGT designation for Kosovo, as these might resemble the
factors encouraging and restraining designation in other cases. Second, to put
in perspective the risks in extending decolonization, I will consider the risks
presented by the course NATO member states in fact chose for Kosovo.
There area number of balancing mechanisms inherent in UN decoloniza-
tion practice. To designate a territory an NSGT requires concurrence of a
majority of the voting members of the General Assembly-at present, nearly
half the states of the world. This is a meaningful procedural barrier. Yet it is
not necessarily a formula for political blockade. One of the problems noted
at the outset of this article is that Security Council authorization for use of
force, owing to the problem of UN politics, is frequently impossible to
obtain-thus the frustration leading to reliance on the mandate of a regional
security organization. But the General Assembly cannot be prevented by one
state or a small number of states from elevating a territory like Kosovo to
NSGT status. Preventing the measure requires a majority of the member
states.
The fact that NSGT designation requires concurrence of a majority of the
UN member states would restrain the process. Yet it would not be as difficult
to achieve as Security Council action. The veto power of permanent members
has made the Council undependable as a source of collective security policy.
And as long as the Security Council remains the only UN organ that might
address crises such as Kosovo, the risk remains serious that the UN system
will be bypassed altogether. If the proposition is correct that the UN, as the
most broadly constituted international organization, contributes to public
order, then a conceptual framework encouraging such bypass subtracts from
public order. Conversely, making the General Assembly and the decoloniza-
tion processes it oversaw from World War II through the early 1970s a
possible modality through which to address latter-day self-determination crises
would produce positive public order effects. The fact that the decolonization
process contains balancing mechanisms might make it succeed.
If the requirement of geographic remoteness were removed, Kosovo might
have satisfied the General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) criteria for
admission to NSGT status. However, at least two political factors could
nonetheless have militated against the General Assembly voting to designate
Kosovo an NSGT. First, many countries in which there are potential separatist
minorities (e.g., France, Canada, Britain, China, Russia, India, Iraq) might
oppose extension of NSGT status to a territory integral to the geography of a
state. Second, though many states in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean were
themselves NSGTs and benefitted from that status during their own processes
of independence, many of these same states were members of the Non-Aligned
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Movement of which Yugoslavia was a leader. Residual affinity toward
Yugoslavia from the days of Marshal Tito's support for nonalignment might
lead some former colonies to vote against NSGT status for Kosovo. Such
political or sentimental dynamics would be present in many situations where
a territory was nominated for consideration by the General Assembly for
NSGT status. The dynamics would have a restraining effect. It is a matter of
speculation whether that effect would overpower the decolonization process.
It may well be that when confronted with severe and notorious deprivation of
self-determination, individual member states would see themselves clear to
principled voting.95 The fact that states in March 1999 were willing with some
boldness to push forward the law of humanitarian intervention, even in the
face of the principle of territorial integrity, suggests that in certain cases NSGT
designation might very well be obtainable for territories like Kosovo. The risk
that it would not-or that it would be too frequently-should be measured next
to changes in international law likely to result from the course in fact chosen
in March 1999.
A potentially radical change in international law toward which Operation
Allied Force may have legislated concerns territorial integrity. The argument
was put forward at the outset of Operation Allied Force that considerations of
territorial integrity were unnecessary as regarded Yugoslavia. One of the most
striking expositions of the argument was made by Paul R. Williams. Writing
for the Balkan Action Council, Williams stated that "the former Yugoslavia
is still in the process of dissolution and Serbia/Montenegro is not a recognized
state under international law [and thus] does not possess full rights of
sovereignty and territorial integrity."' He added to this that the FRY is neither
a recognized state nor the continuation of the SFRY and thus does not enjoy
ordinary protections guarding its territorial integrity.
95 Involving an additional institution might allay fears that the General Assembly would use
NSGT designation excessively. Perhaps the process to designate a territory an NSGT could be
changed to require two votes-one by the General Assembly and one by the International Court
of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ could be bid assess whether there obtained in a given instance (1)
severe deprivation of self-determination and (2) the characteristics of ethnic distinctness. In
cases widely understood to merit NSGT designation, the ICJ would likely concur and thus not
pose a real additional hurdle. If, by contrast, a majority of states in the General Assembly formed
a political block and used the designation process simply to vex an enemy, the ICJ could
exercise a veto and thus block designation. The ICJ would in this view be a safeguard against
spurious NSGT designations. If it worked as such, then states would perhaps hesitate less to
make NSGT designations in justifiable cases.
96 Paul R. Williams, Legal Basis for NATO Military Action Taken Against
Serbia/Montenegro (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://www.balkanaction.org/about.html>.
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The argument is problematic in a number of respects. Two in particular
require address. First, the premise that the FRY is still dissolving is doubtful.
The Badinter Commission, in its first opinion, Opinion No. 1 of November 19,
1991, had concluded that the SFRY was in theprocess of dissolution.97 A later
opinion, Opinion 8 of July 4, 1992, announced that the SFRY had dissolved.9
In Opinion 8, the Commission would seem to have identified the process as
having ended. The logic of the Commission's language casts doubt on
whether the FRY in 1999 was subject still to the dissolution identified in
Opinion 1. To say that the FRY was still dissolving is to ignore Opinion 8 and
the contrast between its wording and the wording of Opinion 1. Moreover, the
Badinter Commission opinions aside, it seems improbable that a status of such
uncertainty could go on for nearly eight years. The FRY was, in terms of
municipal order, a comparatively stable entity from July 1992, at least until
unrest intensified in Kosovo in March 1998. Even after that, until it led to
NATO action, the unrest hardly seemed an immediate threat to the cohesion
of the FRY. It would be very surprising if for the period 1992-99 the FRY was
"dissolving."
Even if it is accepted that the SFRY/FRY in March 1999 was still
dissolving, that situation is not necessarily relevant to Kosovo. The dissolu-
tion, which Badinter Opinions I and 8 determined, respectively, was
happening and finished, concerned a system of governance and constitutive
order binding together six republics of the SFRY. When that system ended,
it left in its wake a disaggregated assemblage of republics. Importantly, the
system in question did not directly involve the two autonomous provinces
within Serbia, one of the republics. The atomistic units of that system, as it
were, were the republics, not subunits of the republics. The Badinter Opinions
may not have said this explicitly, but they did emphasize that the institutions
that were collapsing (thus leading to the dissolution of the SFRY) were
institutions relating to the participation of the republics (not of subunits of the
republics) in SFRY governance. It is therefore arguable that dissolution of the
ruling institutions of the SFRY would have had no immediate impact on the
constitutional position of the Vojvodina and Kosovo.
Second, the Balkan Action Council's legal position implies a role for the
recognition of states that modem practice and the opinion of publicists have
widely rejected. It is now taken to be the better view that recognition does not
97 See Opinion No. I of the Arbitration Commission of the E.C. Conference on Yugoslavia
(the "Badinter Commission"), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1494 (1992).




create a state. Even if certain aspects of statehood (e.g., competence to
conclude treaties or participate in international organizations) depend on
recognition, basic rights of a community most certainly do not depend on
recognition. Among these rights is the right to be free from the threat or use
of force. The UN Charter article 2(4) prohibition does not run to UN member
states alone. 99 It is a curious result of the formulation advanced in the Balkan
Action Council position that Kosovo, itself unrecognized as a state, would
enjoy no right to territorial integrity. The problems in a view that holds it to
be "open season" on unrecognized states ought to be readily apparent.'00 That
that view should be advanced to promote an extension of humanitarian law is
ironic.
NATO action against Yugoslavia essentially consisted of (1) an armed
intervention; (2) by a regional defensive organization; (3) without authoriza-
tion by the UN Security Council; (4) against a state with uncertain interna-
tional legal status; (5) to prevent a humanitarian disaster (possibly genocide);
(6) in an administrative subunit of the state target of the intervention. These
features of the action made it unusual within the recent history of use of force.
A number of incidents involving the use of force in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries arguably resembled Operation Allied Force, at least with
regard to its enforcement of norms on the internal constitutive processes of a
state. Interventions against the Ottoman Empire to protect Christian minorities
and against certain Latin American states to enforce debt service come to
mind. Such cases do not, however, prefigure the Kosovo action very closely.
It may indeed be best to characterize the Kosovo action as an event sui generis
and of law-formative effect.'0 ' The exact changes that Operation Allied Force
will have on international law will not be known for some time, but the action
would seem to expose a number of areas to possible revision.
The UN system for the regulation of use of force may be the aspect of
international legal order that comes first to mind when thinking about how
99 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
"o The merits of the Balkan Action Council's position aside, the prevailing position was not
that territorial integrity did not apply to Yugoslavia, but rather that humanitarian considerations
trumped territorial integrity. See supra p. 19 and note 35 (discussing publicists' assessments of
the legality of Operation Allied Force).
'0' Lewis, Conflict in the Balkans, supra note 37, at A 10 (showing that the Kosovo crisis is
raising new ideas and difficult questions of international law that may have a law formative
effect); Doyle, supra note 24, at A 12 (quoting Ruth Wedgewood of YLS who calls the action
legally innovative); see also Peter Riddell, NA TO Attacks Create New Doctrine of Intervention,
TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 26, 1999, at 8, available in 1999 WL 7982618; William Rees-Magg,
Where's the Justice?, TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 29, 1999, at 20, available in 1999 WL 7983245.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Operation Allied Force may change the law. Warnings that the Kosovo action
will result in degradation of the UN system whole clothe" 2 may be tempered,
however, by considering the vitality of that system in the first place. The UN
has seldom been as robust a mechanism for regulating armed force as its
founders may have envisioned. Furthermore, a permanent UN general staff
and standing UN corps have never been established. Combatants in a number
of conflicts have not heeded UN practice. Yet, simply because the Charter has
fallen short of the most optimistic projections of those who drafted it does not
mean that the UN system has been wholly inoperative. A number of its
provisions may have become established features of the international legal
order, and at least one of these may well be derogated by Operation Allied
Force.
Article 52 of the UN Charter recognizes the right of states to form regional
collective security organizations. The most successful of these organizations
has been NATO. In April 1949, NATO was originally established for self-
defense. If any one member state of the Alliance were attacked, all other
members were bound by the NATO treaty to use force to repel the attacker.
The UN Charter permits this. However, article 53 of the Charter makes clear
that regional collective security organizations are not permitted to use force
without Security Council authorization (at least where members of the
organization are not under attack). A noteworthy aspect of Operation Allied
Force is that its mandate came essentially from the North Atlantic Council, the
political arm of NATO. This bypasses UN Charter article 53. If the rule of
article 53 is overtaken by Operation Allied Force, then interesting results could
follow.
NATO, though the most successful collective security organization, is not
the only one. The states of West Africa, for example, have organized
themselves in a collective security arrangement. Similar arrangements have
existed in the Americas, the Far East, and Eastern Europe. The Arab League
was formed to promote the mutual interests and common defense of the Arab
states. Suppose there were a resurgence of violence on the West Bank and
Israeli security forces killed a number of Palestinians and damaged Palestinian
property. Would the Arab League, by a unanimous resolution of its member
states, have the legal authority to engage in an armed action against Israel?
Under the precedent set by Operation Allied Force, Arab League lawyers
might well argue that it would. The Israeli riposte in all likelihood would run
along lines something like the following: human rights violations committed
by Israel on the West Bank, if any, are not to be compared to those committed
102 See supra pp. 17-19 and accompanying notes.
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by Yugoslavia in Kosovo. This, however, would simply beg a further
question. How serious do violations have to be in order to justify an attack by
a regional collective security organization? Quandaries will arise when the
facts are ambiguous-something worse than sporadic violation of a putative
economic right but not as bad as open prosecution of genocide. Even if an
objective standard were set in law, there is still the question of who would
decide the facts. The Warsaw Pact countries all agreed in 1967 that something
had to be done about Czechoslovakia. This agreement encompassed a reading
of both the law and facts that could never have been obtained at the UN level.
Allowing NATO to decide that the violations of human rights in Kosovo in
1999 justified armed intervention furnishes legal precedent for future
intervention by regional security organizations elsewhere. 3
The Kosovo action is unlikely to revise in its entirety the system for
regulating force which is embodied in the UN Charter. Nor is it likely to leave
that system entirely intact.
This in turn leads to a second aspect of international law that may change
under the influence of Operation Allied Force. International lawyers have long
said that what states did within their own borders was not a matter which
international law could address. Acts by one state against another might be
actionable, but if the impact of the acts of a state were limited to its own
citizens, then other states had no business intervening. This rule has been
under reconstruction for some time. Events in the 1990s in particular have
changed the rule. The United States led an intervention in Haiti, not because
Haiti was under attack or was attacking another state, but because the
government of Haiti refused to respect the results of a democratic election in
Haiti."° Similar actions were undertaken by the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) in 1990 in Liberia" 5 and in 1998 in Sierra
'03 It could be, however, that interventions by regional security organizations such as those
in West Africa and the Balkans are now sufficiently numerous that a customary international
norm governing them is emerging. Wedgewood alludes to the possibility, noting specifically
that "NATO can claim the legitimacy of a nineteen-nation decision process, and the normative
commitments of a democratic Europe." Wedgewood, supra note 30, at 832-33. I have
suggested elsewhere that collective process may be required by international law in certain forms
of decision-making but that international law is taking shape to permit states to define
"collective." THOMAS D. GRANT, RECOGNITIONOF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE INDEBATE AND
EVOLUTION 187-93 (1999).
"o See Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the
United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 341 (1995); Olivier Corten, La Resolution 940 du Conseil
de Scuritl Autorisant une Intervention Militaire en Haity: l'emergence d'un Principe de
Ligitimiti Dtnocratique en Droit International?, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 116 (1995).
os See Lobel & Ratner, supra note 23, at 126.
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Leone. 6 The no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq were extended to
protect minorities in Iraq (Kurds in the north, Shi'ite Arabs in the south) from
their own government.' 7 In none of these cases was armed intervention
justified on traditional grounds--defense of a state from attack by another
state. Instead, a new rule was being applied. Under that rule, states may
intervene to protect the people of one state against their fellow citizens and
rulers. NATO intervention against Yugoslavia is a new, and by far the most
decisive, application to date of the new rule. Though some Kosovar Albanians
have declared their province a state, nobody had recognized Kosovo as a state
at the time Operation Allied Force commenced. NATO intervention had as its
purpose the changing of the internal order of Yugoslavia-not the traditional
purpose of defending one state from another.
This change in international law is momentous. In effect, it erodes the state
as an independent unit in international affairs-or, at any rate, takes from
external regulation certain acts within its borders.0 Some international
lawyers once described the state as a social order independent from any other
social order.0 9 That description, under the Kosovo precedent, can no longer
,06 See Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts
and the Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333
(1998); David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 157 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch ed., 1993).
107 See generally Alain E. Boileau, To the Suburbs of Baghdad: Clinton's Extension of the
Southern Iraqi No-Fly Zone, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 875 (1997) (arguing that the real
reason for the extension of the no-fly zones was to protect oil fields in Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia); Jane E. Stromseth, Iraq 's Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses
and Continuing Challenges, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN
INTERNAL CONFLICTS, supra note 106, at 77.
"' See W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo 'sAntinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'LL. 860-62 (1999) (stating
that the development of the UN Charter, "by eliminating for serious human rights violations the
defense of domestic jurisdiction, removed from the sphere of the 'political independence' of a
state the right to violate in grave fashion and with impunity the human rights of its inhabitants").
'09 Baty wrote of a form of self-containment being an essential attribute of statehood, calling
it "the existence among the people, or the bulk of the people, of a certain mutual reliance, not
participated in by the outside world." THOMAS BATY, THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13
(1930). According to Henkin, statehood involves "privacy" or "impermeability." LOUIS
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 10-12 (1995). And Kelsen wrote of
"impenetrability" in connection with statehood: "The principle that the national legal order has
the exclusive validity for a certain territory, the territory of the state in the narrower sense, and
that within this territory all individuals are subjected only and exclusively to this national legal
order or to the coercive power of this state, is usually expressed by saying that only one state can
exist on the same territory, or-borrowing from physics, that the State is 'impenetrable.' "HANS
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 212 (Anders Wiedberg trans., 1949).
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be entirely accurate, if ever it were. Again, problems may arise when this new
concept of the relationship between states and international society is applied
in the future. For example, consider the domestic situation in Indonesia. In
that large developing country, a small minority of Indonesian citizens of
Chinese ethnic background control as much as seventy percent of the
economy. Indigenous Indonesians are openly hostile to the Chinese minority.
At times, they have subjected their Chinese fellow citizens to attacks which
observers have compared to pogroms earlier this century against European
Jews." o Under the traditional view, no state could take action against
Indonesia for conduct that had no direct impact on persons outside the borders
of Indonesia. However, under the Kosovo precedent, the rule is different. If
Indonesians began a new round of terror against their Chinese co-nationals, an
outside state would have an arguable case for intervention. Would a People's
Republic of China, keen on geopolitical expansion, use the opportunity to take
over Indonesia? Would Russia try to revive the Soviet Union if persons of
Russian ethnic background came under attack in the Baltic Republics or, more
plausibly, one of the five Central Asian states?" 1 Such questions are more
serious from the standpoint of international law now than before Operation
Allied Force. Closer to home for Americans, erosion of the independence of
the state from outside norms may expose to new international criticism United
States laws not widely approved in the developed world. Western Europeans,
for example, oppose the death penalty." 2 There is, of course, no realistic
,0 For a fascinating analysis of this vexed situation, and the relationship generally between
ethnic conflict and free market reforms, see Amy L. Chua, 93 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
(publication forthcoming 1999). See generally Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and
Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998)
(discussing the phenomenon of ethnic minorities who have dominated economically the
indigenous majorities around the one); Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle:
The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 223
(1995) (explaining the tension between "true" Indonesians and the country's Chinese minority).
. See John Quigley, Russian Minorities in the Newly Independent States, 3 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 455 (1997); see also KAREN DAWISHA & BRUCE PARROTT, RUSSIA AND THE NEW
STATES OF EURASIA: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 65-66 (1994).
"12 A number of writers address the death penalty as a matter of international human rights
law. See Kristi Tumminello Prinzo, Note, The United States-'Capital' of the World. An
Analysis of Why the United States Practices Capital Punishment While the International Trend
Is Towards its Abolition, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 855 (1999); William A. Schabas, International
Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 797 (1998). But see Jack
Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & the United States Double Standard, 1 GREEN
BAG 2D 365 (1998) (arguing that the promotion of international human rights conventions by
the United States and American hesitancy to permit the norms embodied in those conventions
to apply to the states of the United States are not inconsistent). See also Council of Europe
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question of foreign armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the United
States. But the legal bases for foreign pressure in the domestic affairs of all
countries are arguably reinforced by the intervention in Yugoslavia.
By the same token, states may find after Operation Allied Force that the
way they manage their own provinces or federal regions is no longer strictly
a domestic matter. A further legal result of Operation Allied Force may well
be to increase the profile of the subunits of states in international affairs.
Kosovo is a province of Serbia, which in turn is a constituent republic of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The traditional view under international law
was that subunits of a state-even subunits with substantial powers of their
own such as possessed by the fifty states of the United States-were not
subjects of international law. Any profile that such subunits might have
enjoyed outside the borders of their own country existed at the sufferance of
the central government. The relations between the central government and its
territorial subunits or provinces was of no legal interest to other countries.
Operation Allied Force, while at one level about the rights of individual human
beings, was also about the federal structure of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's
rejection of the Rambouillet agreement triggered the 1999 NATO action and
required Yugoslavia to restore to Kosovo the autonomy stripped from it in
1989. Under the traditional view, Yugoslavia's internal federal relations
would have been a matter for Yugoslavia alone to govern. State practice is
instructive. In 1962, the central government of Ethiopia terminated the
autonomy of Eritrea, a former possession of Italy which had joined Ethiopia
after World War II on the promise that it remain largely independent from the
central government." 3 No international action was taken against Ethiopia
when it went back on the promise. The change was a change in the federal
structure of Ethiopia and was not believed to have repercussions under
international law. The rule implied by after Operation Allied Force, however,
would be different. A subunit of a federation, such as Kosovo, may become
the object of international legal interest. At the very least, instruments
defining the relationship between the subunit and federation may begin to be
viewed as instruments governed by international law.
This could advance by some measure developments already underway in
important states. In the United States for example, states (the subunits of the
Parliamentary Assembly, Report on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Europe (Rapporteur:
Mrs. Wohlwend (Liechtenstein)) A.Doc. 7589, of June 25, 1996 (illustrating European
consensus against the death penalty).
" See EYASSu GAYIM, THE ERITREAN QUESTION: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE INTERESTS OF STATES 445-48(1993).
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federation) have challenged the long-assumed monopoly of the federal
government over foreign affairs. A Massachusetts law, for example, in
promotion of the international human rights policy of the Commonwealth
legislature, restricts the Commonwealth government from doing business with
companies doing business in Burma (Myanmar). "4 If this is a trend on the part
of United States states, then it may be strengthened, indirectly at any rate, by
action which conceives of a subunit of a country as a proper subject of
international legal concern. Operation Allied Force may change the status of
federal units and provinces in relation to international law and in relation to the
central governments of their own countries.
In Yugoslavia, a province may well be on its way to becoming at least de
facto an independent state. But a Kosovar state will in all likelihood be
dependent on armed international support, both for protection against outside
foes (namely, Serbia) and for domestic stability. Another result of Operation
Allied Force may be a resurgence of a form of statehood that was quite
common in the nineteenth century but rejected in the twentieth-the
protectorate." 5 The premise behind a protectorate was that a given state
lacked the internal cohesion to govern its own affairs or to defend itself against
outside forces. Foreign countries, usually European, established protectorates
over many states in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. British India
was not a unitary entity but, in essence, a series of protected states. Protector-
ates such as Nigeria, Malaysia, and Morocco in fact were scattered throughout
the colonial empires. The protectorate by the end of World War II was
"' The Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in Burma
(Myanmar) of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, sec. 1, 1996 Mass. Acts 210, reprinted in MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. CH. 7, § 22G-22M (West 1997). For comment, see Daniel M. Price & John P.
Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 443 (1998) (discussing threat to international trading system by local state sanction laws
against Burma); Joel P. Trachtman, Non-actor States in U.S. Foreign Relations? The
Massachusetts Burma Law, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 350 (1998) (arguing legality of the
Burma Law); David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local
Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997) (discussing punitive measures against Burma by United States
laws penalizing firms conducting business in Burma); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts,
Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997) (challenging the notion that taking
power from federal government and giving to state governments in United States does not affect
foreign affairs); U.S. State and Local Trade Sanctions: Can Massachusetts "Free Burma "?, 93
AM. SOC'Y INT'L PROC. (publication forthcoming 1999) (panel participants: Abby Cohen
Smutny, Peter J. Spiro, Robert Stumberg, and Edward T. Swaine).
"15 See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth
Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 1, 54-57 (1999) (on the nineteenth century
protectorate-the protectorate in its classic form).
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rejected as a model of governance, however, on the grounds that it was a
fagade for western conquest. The post-Cold War era, remarkably, may be
witnessing creation of a new version of the old form. Not a tool for conquest
but a response to humanitarian crisis, the latter-day protectorate would appear
to be largely divorced from the material interests of the protecting powers.
Nonetheless, it would also appear to involve some of the essential elements of
its precursor--on-going armed intervention, substantial external influence on
constitution-making, foreign involvement in courts and other government
bodies. Writers have duly noted that intervention, even when lacking the
semi-permanence implied by protectorate status and when justified on
humanitarian grounds, carries risks.'"
6
The idea of a modern protectorate is arguably much in evidence in
Bosnia."1 7 There, the constitution of the state was drafted overseas, in a
language foreign to the state, and guaranteed by a "contact group" of outside
states. Foreign troops, with powers similar to those of an occupying army
police, draw domestic dividing lines between hostile ethnic groups and guard
Bosnia against Serbia. Foreign legal experts sit on key Bosnian judicial
panels. The Bosnian government depends on external financial aid. It is
difficult to imagine how an independent Kosovo could survive without a
similar arrangement. Instability caused by the mass exodus of Kosovar
116 See Richard Falk, The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order
Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491 (1996) (assessing the change in interventionary diplomacy
since the end of the Cold War); David Wippman, Treaty-BasedIntervention: Who Can Say No?,
62 U. CHI. L. REv. 607 (1995) (exploring whether a treaty can lawfully authorize forcible
external intervention into internal affairs); David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional
Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & Int'l L. 209 (1996) (discussing the
controversial justification and problems of host-state consent for military intervention); Nowrot
& Schabacker, supra note 51, at 321 (discussing the justification of the ECOWAS actions in
Sierra Leone by defining humanitarian intervention and discussing when it is permitted under
international law).
117 It may be that the nineteenth century logic of protectorates is inverted in the new version
of the old form. Protecting powers in the nineteenth century aimed chiefly to prevent competing
powers from establishing influence over the protected states in its international relations.
Municipal governance was left to the inhabitants of the protected state. In the new form of
protectorate, the logic is somewhat different. The protected state is free to engage in
international relations in the manner its inhabitants through their own government choose;
competition among potential protecting powers is not a factor. But municipal governance, rather
than being left to the inhabitants, is regulated in detail. Also, the new protectorate tends to be
guaranteed not by a single power but by alliances of powers. On the advent of a new form of
protected state, see Thomas D. Grant, Toward a New Protectorate? Bosnia and Cyprus as




Albanians into neighboring states might well result in the need for still further
international protectorates in the region. Macedonia and Albania in particular
could find themselves dependent states in much the same way Bosnia has been
since the Dayton-Paris Accords. If Montenegro, the other federal unit of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, increases its protest and breaks with Serbia
to make its own state, the hostility of the Yugoslav federal army and the
Kosovar refugee crisis would probably result there too in an international
protectorate, in fact if not in name."'
It may be that approaching the problem of internal ethnic minorities by
extending General Assembly decolonization practice also magnifies the
importance of sub-state units under international law and thus itself presents
at least one of the problems that the NATO by-pass presents."I9 After all, once
designated an NSGT, a territory participates in a public order process that is
no longer strictly municipal-the administering power has obligations to
report on the territory to the UN, and the territory may choose to alter its
relationship with the administering power. The territory may even, where the
administering power fails grossly in its obligations, pursue by force a change
in that relationship. At least two factors, however, might make extending the
process of decolonization safer than the approach in fact taken toward Kosovo.
First, as noted above, declaring a sub-state unit a non-self governing
territory will require concurrence by a majority of the General Assembly
membership. This is no mere procedural nicety and would likely be difficult
to accomplish in most cases. Yet, unlike the approach which relies on Security
Council competence over use of force, extending the process of decolonization
cannot be blockaded by a single state. Political problems which make the
Security Council an unreliable organ for enforcement may arise in the General
Assembly. However, the majority voting procedure in the General Assembly
makes obstructionist tactics much less likely to succeed. The NATO by-pass
promotes a rule that permits a regional security organization to decide, without
reference to constituencies broader than its membership, that a sub-state unit
has become an object of valid international juridical interest. The UN process
of decolonization requires more than that. Assuming that it is desirable, when
seeking to constitute new rules, to do so on the broadest basis possible, this
procedural safeguarding makes the decolonization approach preferable to one
taking place outside UN institutions.
Is That "failed states" in the Balkans are becoming "protectorates" has been suggested
elsewhere. See Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903 (1997).
"' See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Second, extending decolonization makes clear to the parties most directly
involved that internationalization is in progress. Before use of force is valid,
an open declaration is made by the General Assembly that the ethnic minority
territory has taken on a legal status distinguishing it (though not yet severing
it) from the parent state. In designating the territory an NSGT, the General
Assembly transforms its legal status and, in effect, puts all parties on notice
that territorial integrity is no longer the paramount legal factor. Moreover, the
status entails a set of obligations on the parent state. These obligations have
been announced with relative clarity by the extensive practice surrounding
decolonization over the past fifty years. The argument that use of force
derogates the territorial integrity of the parent state-a sound one that favors
the FRY in -Operation Allied Force-would be largely beside the point after
General Assembly action designating an ethnic minority territory like Kosovo
an NSGT.
The path chosen to address Kosovo will have law-formative impact, and the
exact extent and direction of the changes it effects are difficult to predict. It
may well be that an extension of the process of decolonization, contained as
it would be in UN institutions and regulating as it might the tension between
territorial integrity and self-determination, would conserve areas of the law
that the chosen path is likely to revise.
VII. CONCLUSION
Self-determination has been given practical effect in two ways. It has been
given practical effect through preservation of legal orders, and it has been
given practical effect through revision of legal orders. Preservation of a legal
order is sufficient for groups whose right to self-determination is perfected
under that order. Revision may be necessary for groups whose right is as yet
unperfected.
Revision of legal order in pursuit of self-determination, in turn, has taken
place essentially through two mechanisms. A process of change involving the
consent of both the beneficiaries of the existing order and the party seeking
revision is one mechanism. Decolonization is the other mechanism. Starting
simply as a species of consensual change, decolonization was developed
through UN practice into its own distinct form. Decolonization became, by the
1960s, a mechanism to achieve revisions of legal order where consent was
lacking.
Kosovo presents the most difficult case. Consensual processes have failed
there, so the first mechanism to revise legal order to achieve self-determina-
tion, revision through consent, is inapplicable. The second mechanism, the
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UN process of decolonization, however, in its current form, would not reach
a territory like Kosovo.
This article proposes that the process of decolonization developed during
the UN era be extended. In particular, it proposes that the process be extended
to reach territories the peoples of which have not realized self-determination
yet which are contiguous to the state exercising control over them. The
process so extended could address crises in self-determination in an effective
manner, yet without the broad and unpredictable legal revision made likely by
the NATO response to Kosovo's troubled claims of right. Extending
decolonization keeps international response within the framework of the UN
yet may pose much less risk of political blockade than the Security Council
approach. It puts in proper sequence the change in juridical status of the ethnic
minority territory and the threat of use of force, thus clearing the air of the risk
of violating the territorial integrity of a state. The approach does push the
decolonization practice of the UN into a new sphere-ethnic minority
territories contiguous to the powers that administer them. But this would not
be the first bold step in the decolonization practice of the UN. Nor does this
introduce an entirely new, and thus inherently less predictable, form of
international action.
The only unambiguous successes of self-determination in achieving
nonconsensual transformations of territorial situations have been in the
framework of decolonization. Decolonization is, on that precedent, the logical
institution in which to vest further development of self-determination. Indeed,
the view is not correct that the process of decolonization has constrained self-
determination; the process of decolonization has given self-determination its
fullest legal effect. 21 If it is a virtue when changing the law to leave intact as
12' For the view that the decolonization process is a limit on self-determination, see Angela
M. Lloyd, Note, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession, 32 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 419, 425-27 (1994) ("The former colonialists checked the legal right to self-
determination at decolonization."); Kingsbury, supra note 88, at 438-39 ("Real engagement with
the interests and aspirations of social collectivities involves a much more complex actualization
of self-determination than the law of decolonization has established."); Gerry J. Simpson, The
Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-determination in the Postcolonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255,
256-57 (1996) ("[T]he decolonization model is a demonstrably unwieldy and inflexible device
for use in [cases of indigenous, nationalist, secessionist, democratic, and devolutionary self-
determination]."); see also Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the
Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 610-11 (1996); Feisal Hussain Naqvi, People's
Rights or Victim's Rights: Reexamining the Conceptualization of Indigenous Rights in
International Law, 71 IND. L.J. 673, 707 (1996); Yoram Dinstein, Is there a Right to Secede?,
90 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 299-300 (1996); Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety:
International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1998) ("But
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much of the surrounding legal system as possible while accommodating the
purposes for which change is contemplated, then extending the existing
process of decolonization to achieve self-determination for Kosovo may well
have been an approach worth trying.
however richly textured, these applications of the principle of self-determination were confined
to special cases. When statecraft affirmed the principle of self-determination, states limited its
applied sphere, precluding sweeping claims of entitlement by separatist groups."). But the
question should not be why, how, or where did states limit self-determination; states after all had
the formidable advantage of incumbency. They did not in short have any obligation to grant or
permit self-determination. The real question is, why, how, or where did states allow self-
determination. And the answer, at least as to "how" and "where," is the process of decoloniza-
tion. Hurst Hannum gets it right. "[S]elf-determination," he writes, "except in the ... context of
decolonization, is not absolute.... Recognizing that one has a right to self-determination does
not imply that one can always exercise the right to its maximum extent." [emphasis added]
Hannum, supra note 53, at 777. The notable phenomenon is not the limit on the principle. The
notable phenomenon is the institution, decolonization, that has permitted its vindication in so
many places.
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